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Introduction

In his day, Pierre Bayle was highly regarded as a philosopher and
thinker. His writings on religion influenced the skepticism of David Hume,
and thinkers such as Leibniz felt compelled to respond to his positions in
their books.1 Today, however, Pierre Bayle has fallen into relative obscurity,
along with his theory of toleration. I hope to do my small part to rectify the
latter misfortune in this thesis, and also to help sharpen Bayle’s theory of toleration so that it can be more useful for current theorists. In part two, I
give an exposition of Bayle’s moral theory and his defense of broad religious
toleration, while attempting to show that the defense of toleration is still
compelling even when we don’t share all of Bayle’s suppositions. This sets
the state for part three, where I attempt to improve Bayle’s theory by deriving a normative principle of toleration from his account of the limits of legitimate toleration.

1

Pierre Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23,
"Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full", ed. John Kilcullen and Chandran
Kukathas (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2005), xii.
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An Exposition of Bayle’s Moral Theory

2.1 Introduction to Part Two

Pierre Bayle was one of the first writers, along with John Locke and
Benedict Spinoza, to offer a defense of broad religious toleration in the late
17th century. That defense, in turn, could be extended to a defense of toleration of different political beliefs and practices as well. Bayle’s account is
unique because it most directly attacks the most prominent argument
against broad religious toleration: that of St. Augustine’s. Augustine argued,
based on the quote from the Gospel, “Compel them to come in”, that 1)
Christians are obligated to compel non-Christians and heretics to the orthodox
faith, and 2) the use of violence was able to open recalcitrant individuals to
the truth of Roman Catholicism.2 Therefore, the use of violence against heretics for the purpose of opening their eyes to the truth was both possible,
permitted, and in some cases obligatory.
Bayle takes on Augustine’s argument against toleration by use of two
methods: he argues that on an exegetical level, Augustine’s interpretation of
the biblical phrase is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel, and second, that
philosophy shows us that compulsion in religious matters is neither practically useful nor morally acceptable. For the purposes of this essay, I will fo-

2

Bayle 2005, xvii.
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cus on Bayle’s philosophical arguments against intolerance. In the second
part, I will attempt to show that Bayle’s arguments against intolerance still
hold some force, even when we don’t grant all of Bayle’s assumptions regarding the existence of God. This will provide the context for part three,
which attempts to derive a normative theory of what we ought to tolerate.
2.2 The Context of Bayle’s Argument
Bayle wrote in the 17th century, during a time in which both Protestants and Catholics claimed that they had the right and obligation to persecute those who did not agree with them, or who disagreed about points of
doctrine. The main argument for intolerance was that of St. Augustine. Augustine originally thought that heretical sects in Christianity ought to be tolerated, since true belief in religious matters cannot be forced if it is to be genuine. Since only genuine religious belief is valuable, there is no reason to
endorse the use of persecution in religious matters. But Augustine changed
his opinion after the Donatist persecution in 409.
The Donatist’s were a Christian sect that held beliefs opposed to those
of the Catholic Church. Due to many historical factors the authorities at the
time decided to stop tolerating the Donatists and instead forced them to
convert to Catholicism. The efficacy of their efforts convinced Augustine that
his previous objections against intolerance were not cogent, and thus provided the context for him to write an essay justifying Roman persecution of
the Donatist sect. Augustine likened religious false belief to a potentially fa-

4

tal disease: those who held false beliefs were liable to be damned to hell,
and so it was incumbent upon good Christians to save them, much like it’s
incumbent to save someone from a fatal sickness.3
This leads to the issue of whether coercion is an efficacious or acceptable method by which to spread religious Doctrine. Augustine acknowledges
that coercion doesn’t by itself produce the beliefs that are necessary for salvation; but he asserts that coercion is capable of opening heretics’ “Eyes to
the truth".4 The threat of violence might compel people, Augustine says, into
viewing the relative worth of the beliefs more accurately then they would
otherwise. Augustine cites the fact that entire cities had converted back to
Catholicism as evidence that coercion in such matters is effective.
Augustine then argues that not only is such coercion effective, it is
morally good. While Augustine agrees that coercion in general is not good,
he argues that coercion in the case of true religion is acceptable since the
motive is to save the person, on the general principle that the motive and
the situation affect whether coercion is acceptable. By contrast, heretical attempts to coerce individuals are not permissible, since the intention behind
them is to make the individual “sicker.” Therefore, it is permissible, effective, and morally good to coerce heretical souls into the true faith of Catholicism.

3
4

Bayle 2005, 293.
Bayle 2005, 333
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2.3 Bayle’s Response to the Efficacy of Coercion
Bayle argues that the traditional justification for coercion is questionable at best due to the empirical evidence concerning its effect. One of the
greatest enemies of truth is the awakening of the “passions”, that is, strong
emotions. When people are in intense fear about something, or are desirous
of something, Bayle argues, they are not able to consider truth very carefully. Hence, our ordinary practice is to use judges that are not connected to
the issue at hand at all.
Persecution, of course, has a tendency to inflame the passions. Why
the prospect of pain should increase the passions is relatively easy to understand: people who think they are about to undergo significant amounts of
pain are apt to be fearful. As a result, they are not able to weigh an issue
carefully when asked to decide between two propositions.5 This has very obvious consequences for the value of persecution: if persons fear the prospect
of being tortured, then their assent to any question put before them is not
likely to be because they have suddenly become aware of the truth of the
proposition. It is probably because they have become aware of the potential
consequences for retaining their former beliefs. If we are not willing to engage in such actions when we want people to carefully consider the truth of
non religious problems, it is unclear, at least for Bayle, why someone should

5

Bayle 2005, 289
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be thought a capable judge between “Catholick and Protestant" while being
forced to deal with the possibility of punishment.6
Augustine might reply that violence is not the only method by which to
force people to examine their beliefs: we might force people to examine
their beliefs by showing them that they could do well materially by switching
their religion. Bayle replies, however, that this method is just as prone to
violence to produce passions in the person being swayed. Bayle does not say
that material inducements and threats of violence are never incapable of
forcing somebody to examine their beliefs carefully and come to the truth;
he implies that threatening punishment if someone refuses instruction about
a certain religion might be acceptable, if we wanted people to be fully informed about their religious decisions.7 So while it is theoretically possible
for someone to be forced to examine religious propositions carefully because
of their punishment, it is extremely unlikely. Therefore, we have strong reason to doubt the efficacy of punishing or rewarding people in an effort to
force them to truly convert to a religion.
This argument by itself does not prove very much. Augustine and
those like him might think that while Pierre Bayle might be right in certain
isolated cases about the efficacy of coercion, they could argue that coercion
works often enough to justify its use in religious matters, even if some persons decide to lie about the truth during the process of coercion. Just be6
7

Bayle 2005, 139
Though see section 3.1 for important caveats as to that position.
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cause a treatment doesn’t work all the time does not mean that it’s worthless, as Augustine himself puts it.8 What’s needed here, then, is an argument that coercion is wrong and dangerous by itself, and not just because
it’s ineffective.
2.4 The Wrongness of Coercion in Religious Matters
The heart of Bayle’s book is meant to provide just this sort of argument, in the guise of interpreting the quote from the gospel, “Compel them
to come in.” Unlike contemporary philosophers, Bayle is not at liberty to present an argument for respecting conscience entirely independent of the context of religious teachings: doing such a thing, and arguing from strictly
secular terms, might lead people to think that Bayle was begging the question. So before Bayle starts setting out his argument for toleration, he needs
to present an argument for how we ought to interpret the relevant claims at
hand concerning religious conduct, namely, the claims that are listed in the
Bible. If Bayle accepts a literal reading of the gospel quote “compel them to
come in”, then he could not hope to successfully argue against intolerance.
Bayle appeals to the principle of “Light of nature”; there are certain
propositions that are so basic that any interpretation of Scripture and morality must be tested against them. We don’t learn these propositions by use of
the Scripture; rather, all human beings know them through the use of the
faculties that God gave them. Bayle includes among these “That the Whole is
8

Compare Bayle 2005, 296.
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greater than the Part; That if we take things equal, the reminder will be
equal.”9 These truths, however, are not merely of a logical and metaphysical
nature; Bayle argues that there are even some (very basic) moral truths included among them, among which are “that ‘tis honest to be grateful to our
Benefactors... and to act by Conscience.” As evidence that all persons who
engage in biblical reading try to not violate some of the principles of natural
light, Bayle demonstrates that church fathers such as “P. Valerien Magni”
tried to show that Catholic doctrines of transubstantiation do not violate the
principle of “The Whole is Greater than the Part”. Now, whether Valerien was
successful in his endeavor is quite irrelevant for Bayle’s purposes; what
Bayle is attempting to show is that it is widely accepted by all participants in
the conversation that there are such principles and that they are accepted as
binding upon all relevant interpretations of the Bible. In this matter, Bayle is
successful: most persons will not admit that their religious doctrines contradict reason, but will instead insist that their doctrines are at least internally
consistent, provided that they are understood in the right way.
One of these basic principles is “That all literal Construction, which
carries an Obligation of committing Iniquity, is false."10 Biblical interpretation, in other words, can never lead to a place that violates the morality that
is given by “natural light”. Thus, if the literal “interpretation” of “compel
them to come in” does result in morally pernicious consequences according
9

Bayle 2005, 73.
Bayle 2005, 66.
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to the doctrines of natural light, then Bayle can conclude that the interpretation is incorrect, thus not warranted by the Bible, and thus immoral to put
into practice. Bayle can thus proceed with his argument on purely philosophical terms, and try to construct an argument against intolerance and compulsion, based purely on the inherent wrongness of compulsion.
2.5 Why Conscience Matters
Turning our eyes back to his discussion of natural light, we should note
that Bayle argues that according to natural light, we find that “there is a Being soverignly perfect, who rules over all things, who ought to be ador’d by
Mankind”, and that we may also conclude that only certain forms of conduct
and worship are pleasing to that God, much as in the same way an earthly
king is pleased only by the real bowing of his subjects, and not by a puppet
or a machine pretending to bow before him.11
Bayle’s doctrine that what counts in terms of worship of God bears a
strong resemblance to Kant’s conception of the good will being the only
thing that matters in morality. Kant argues that the essence of moral action
is that the person who engages in the action does so out of a good and universalizable will: that the action has good consequences or produces certain
physical reactions in the world, does not count towards the appraisal of the

11

Bayle 2005, 76
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action.12 Bayle makes a similar move in putting right action in terms of internal decisions, rather than external consequences; but he differs from Kant
in that he locates the source of good action not in terms of a universalizable
categorical imperative, but in terms of “conscience”. From the principles of
natural light, Bayle believes we know that when we judge an action to be
“good or bad”, we do so, (provided that we are not atheists) on the principle
that this “Rule and law is founded in the Nature of God”.13 Thus, the fact
that a proposition is wrong entails that it must offend God. This leads Bayle
to conclude that if we willfully commit an evil action, we must willfully “offend and disobey God.” If we think we are committing an evil action, then
we must think we are willfully offending and disobeying God. But if we think
we are willfully offending and disobeying God, that entails that we are willfully offending God.

14

Thus, Bayle concludes that acting against our con-

science (what we think is right or wrong), itself entails acting badly. Even if
the consequences turn out to be innocuous, the action is evil.
While Bayle’s written argument hinges on the presence of god, we can
see the force of it by thinking about praiseworthy and blameworthy actions.
If someone commits an action that they think is wrong and vicious, even
though it isn’t, we are inclined to blame them for such an action, even if the

12

Compare Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: On a Supposed Right
to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns, trans. James W. Ellington (Indiananopolis,
Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1993), 15.
13
Bayle 2005, 220
14
Compare John Kilcullen, Sincerity and Truth: Essays on Arnauld, Bayle, and Toleration
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) 68.
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consequences of the action are neutral. For example, suppose that someone
pushed a button because she thought it was supposed to destroy an entire
city, but instead made a thousand kittens happy. Suppose also that she
thought that committing such an action was wrong. In this case, this person
would be blameworthy for the intention behind her action, even if her action
wasn’t objectively wrong after all. The next step in the argument is to shift
our attention from the specific intent of the person, to the general intent of
doing something wrong knowingly. If a person thinks she is doing wrong in
Xing and continues to X, then it is fairly intuitive that she is not praiseworthy
for doing X even if the action is normally considered right (under whatever
theory).
Thus, Bayle’s argument for the importance of doing things according to
conscience does not need to rest on thinking that there is a God who judges
our interior judgments: our ordinary judgments can suffice for teaching us
that acting against our conscience, or what we think to be right, entails that
we commit a somewhat blameworthy action. For the modified Baylean theory, an action can only be good if and only if we act according to our conscience on the matter. However, Bayle does not assert (nor does he need to)
that acting according to what you think is right is sufficient for right action.
As Kilcullen puts it, Bayle can be thought of distinguishing between what
makes an action good, and what makes an action right: an action is poten-

12

tially good without being right.15 Whether it is right or not, for Bayle, depends on the actual moral law that God gives (or in a secular interpretation,
whatever system of morality happens be best), and on whether we act according to our conscience on the matter. We act rightly, then, if and only we
act in a good fashion according to our conscience and our actions actually
accord with the morality that God sets above us. In any system of morality,
if we want people to act rightly or with goodness, then we cannot expect
them to act against what they think is right: instead, we must change what
they think is right or wrong, through the use of rational persuasion.
2.6 The Relationship between Conscience and Toleration
Bayle argues that since an action that is done against conscience is
bad, all persons have an obligation to themselves and to God to follow their
conscience, even if their conscience happens to be incorrect as to the actual
facts (moral or otherwise). In making this case, Bayle gives the case of a
woman who sleeps with a man that she mistakenly believes is her husband,
returned from a long trip.16 Bayle argues that the woman in this case is obligated to sleep with the imposter if she is under the impression that the imposter is her lawful husband.17 Of course, that does not excuse the imposter
for pretending that he is her husband: he ought to be punished, since he is
committing a sin. But she would be doing a wrong if she refused to sleep
15

Kilcullen 1988, 70
Bayle 2005, 234
17
It should be obvious that we can understand Bayle’s example without endorsing Bayle’s
view of male-female relationships
16

13

with him, according to Bayle, since she would be committing an action that
she thinks is wrong, and committing an action that one thinks is wrong is insulting God, and is thus itself wrong. Bayle is not saying that the housewife
merely feels like she is obligated to sleep with the husband, for that would
be a tautology. Bayle is committed to the harder claim that the wife would
be committing a wrong in not following her conscience, even if her conscience was misinformed on the matter.18 She is still obligated to follow her
conscience, in order not to be committing a wrong action.19 In order for
them to not be under a different obligation, their conscience (or what they
think is the right thing to do, which amounts to the same thing) must be
changed by rational persuasion. They have an obligation to act on their conscience, according to Bayle, even if their conscience is in error.
How does the fact that an erring conscience binds bear on tolerance?
The reason Bayle attempts to bring out the importance of how conscience
binds is that the traditional case for religious intolerance rested on the presupposition that the fact that Christians (either Protestants or Catholics, depending on who was doing the persecuting) had the truth on their side rendered their persecution of heathens acceptable. As Augustine’s case put it,
Catholics had the right to persecute heathens because they were making the
18

See Bayle 2005, 220-221 “In like manner this Proposition is evident, That whoever does a
thing which his Conscience tells him is evil, or omits that which his Conscience tells him he
ought to do, commits a Sin.”
19
This does not mean that the wife would be committing a right action if she slept with the
imposter, however. She would be committing, as put above in section 2.5, a good but
wrong action. However, if she refused to sleep with the imposter, she would be committing
a bad and wrongful action.
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heathens better, and because possessing the truth licenses certain efforts
that would not be permitted those who did not hold the truth (hence heathen oppression of Christians was not acceptable, but Christian oppression of
heathens was).
If Bayle’s theory is correct, however, Christians would no longer be
able to say that they are justified in persecuting heathens because they are
in possession of the truth, while heathens are not. Rather, if Christian persecution were acceptable, it would be because persecution would always be
acceptable, no matter who does it, so long as it is in accord with the actor’s
conscience. Bayle’s argument goes like this: when a conscience binds, it
binds regardless of the veracity of the conscience. Let us suppose that it is
an accepted moral law that those who hold correct religious opinions are
morally permitted to coerce others into believing the correct religious opinion
through the use of force. The problem is that this moral right for the correct
religious doctrine to coerce others will also become a moral right for those
who have false opinions about religion, because they will be under the impression that their beliefs are true, making it right for them to coerce. It
would thus be good, and obligatory, for everyone to coerce everybody else
into religion against conscience, no matter whether the religion be true or
false. The fact that makes it obligatory for persons to act in a certain way is
not the truth: it is the fact that they think they have the truth.

15

Most people, of course, will not accept the idea that a world in which
everybody is able to coerce one another into a different religion is one that is
to be counted morally better than one in which the so called “right religion”
is able to coerce (morally). But there is no world, for Bayle, in which it can
be morally good for the correct religion to persecute, while morally bad for
other religions to persecute: for everyone who thinks they are in the correct
religion would also have be good in persecuting those they consider heathens. Thus, in order to coherently say that not everybody has the right to
coerce persons into different religion, we must say that no one has the right
to coerce people into religious faith.20
An objection to Bayle’s argument might be to bite the bullet, and say
provided you really do think that it is right to force others into your religion,
then it really is good for you to coerce others into it: in fact, it is good for
every particular sect to try to violently coerce others into their preferred religion, so long as they sincerely think that it is right. Thus, the fact that coercion on the part of one religion entails coercion on the parts of all religion
would do nothing to entail the wrongness of the reaction of the action.
There are two ways that Bayle could get out of this trap. Bayle agrees
that whether the action is good or not is dependent on whether you believe
your action to be right. He can, nonetheless, consistently deny that thinking
an action is right makes it right. It might be the case that everyone’s action
20

Bayle would add a condition allowing religious faiths cannot unacceptably physically endanger nonbelievers. For more details on this condition, see section 2.0.
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would end up being good, but wrong. The necessary analysis of wrongness
might entail some sort of deontological or consequentialist framework, but
Bayle could say that while it is conceivable for everybody in the world to be
committing a good action by coercing others into the correct religion, it is
not conceivable for them to be committing a right one.
Another route that Bayle could use to rebut this objection is to it is deny the possibility of an intolerant or persecuting act being good, because the
criteria of universalizability will also work to undermine the possibility of an
act of intolerance being considered good. Bayle offers us a method by which
to consider whether we could consider endorsing a certain political practice,
by asking whether we would recommend its adoption by a foreign country.
He also asks his audience to consider if Christians could expect the Chinese
to take in missionaries, considering the practice of Christian missionaries.21
In short, all of the reflections seem to point to an implicit premise: we are
incapable of considering a given practice right, or mandated by conscience,
when presented with evidence that it could not be adopted universally. But a
necessary condition of an action being good, on Bayle’s view, is that the
person who commits the action thinks the action is right. Therefore, if an
argument is given that to any person P that successfully demonstrates a
given action X to be wrong, or at least shows that we cannot be confident

21

See Bayle 2005, 93
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confident that X is right, then the action X as committed by P cannot be considered right by P, and thus cannot be good.22
Bayle has evidence that, more often than not, when faced with an accusation that an action is not universilazable, persons are incapable of thinking that it is good. The common reaction, when persons are told that an action that they perform could not be universalized or would be ridiculous if it
were, is to try to try to deny the claim, suggesting there is some property of
the action that makes it special (for example, only true doctrines get the
benefit of coercion). Alternatively, someone might deny that universalization has any bearing on whether an action is moral or not. In the case of coercion in religious matters, the first of these options is rendered improbable
by Bayle’s fallibilism: we cannot insist that only true doctrines have the right
to coerce, since that assumes we know these matters fully in the first
place.23 The second option would also be unappetizing for Bayle’s contemporaries (and perhaps, for most philosophers), for the basis of the urge to coerce was a universalizing urge. That is, those seeking to use coercion
thought it true that it would be best for everyone if they accepted the religion in question. Thus, Bayle could be relatively at ease about the importance of universalism as a component for evaluation of action. In addition,
the mere presence of Bayle’s book, and the arguments against the rightness
22

At the very least, they must truthfully reckon with the possibility that they could be mistaken. See Section 3.6 for more discussion on the epistemological duties that Bayle’s moral
theory implies.
23
Compare Kilcullen 1988, 86.
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of tolerance, makes it less likely that any such actions of intolerance can
even be considered good, let alone right. Remember that an action is only
good for Bayle if the person who does the action thinks that the action is
right. But if a compelling argument is put forth that questions the rightness
of the action, then the responsible agent’s belief in the rightness of the action must be questioned. If the agent cannot fully believe the action to be
right (or deliberately limits her investigation into whether the action is right)
then the agent cannot be said to be committing even a good action. After
the publication of his book, Bayle could argue that intolerant actions may not
be able to be considered good—at least not without further argument.
We should take pains to realize that what Bayle is proposing here is
not a mere modus vivendi like Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, in the Leviathan,
argued that warring groups should not coerce each other because the costs
of warfare was too high for any individual to rationally bear. He believed
that if the individuals, or groups, in the state of nature could be assured that
they win the fight, than they would have no motivation or reason to honor
the peace. Because of the expense of warfare, though, individuals in modus
vivendi situation agree to not interfere with each other’s situation, and to establish a sovereign to ensure the peace (which may not be the same as tolerating each other). However, Bayle assumes that people will continue to
care very deeply about their religions, and that they will have legitimate objections to the religious practice of others. Bayle is giving an argument that

19

people ought to not interfere with certain behavior because interference
would be morally wrong, not because it would lead to unpleasant consequences for the people who interfered. Tolerators in Bayle’s theory have a
reason for not interfering with the behavior of others.
2.7 The Cost of intolerance In Politics
Of course, those who argue for intolerance may try a different tack.
Instead of just arguing that those who have the true religion are allowed to
persecute others because they hold the truth, those who follow in Augustine’s footsteps may argue that tolerating different religious sects may
“throw the State into all kinds of Confusion”.24 Plurality of religions in any
one state, in this argument, lead to unrest and lack of stability. A plurality of
religions “sets Neighbor at variance with his Neighbor, father against Son”,
because the different religions involved will have different standards of the
good, and all will attempt to take over the powers of the state in order to
repress others. In order to avoid such confusion, the state must therefore
endorse and set one religion over the others, even forcibly repressing them.
This is not an uncommon doctrine among early modern philosophers. Rousseau also thought that in the ideal state there should be an official “civil religion” that all citizens must endorse, as a condition of being part of the
state, on the basis that “wherever theological intolerance is allowed, it is im-

24

Bayle 2005, 199.
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possible for it not to have some civil effect."25 Given incompatibility of plural
religions and stable government, then advocates of intolerance might be
able to argue that intolerance is morally permissible, since an official state
religion is a necessary component of a good and stable state.

26

Bayle takes the potential danger of religious disagreement seriously,
but he denies that the cause of the danger is the fact that governments become too tolerant. Rather, he attributes the danger to the fact that different
religions “endeavor… to crush and destroy the other by methods of Persecution."27 Religions and persons believe in a zero-sum world, in which the winning religion gets the ability to coerce the others using the power of the
state. But working from this fact is misidentifying the problem; if we instead
changed the rules so that religions did not have the power to coerce others
(or declined to because they thought coercion in such matters was a grave
moral wrong), then we would not see instability in such matters. Instead,
each religion, in Bayle’s words, would endeavor to outdo each other by their
“Zeal in the practice of Vertue”, and strive to show that their own religion
was the more virtuous. The religions in question would compete for the favors of God in a way that benefits everyone in the society, much like the
presence of different tradesmen in the society does not mean that the com-
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, ed. Victor
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petitors are forced to fight each other to the death. Since there is no necessary connection between the plurality of religious opinion and the violence
that undermines the state, we can thus attribute the problem purely to the
practices of intolerant religions. Moreover, those who advocate intolerance
are not only the source of instability, but are also responsible for the crimes
that attend state-endorsed policies of intolerance. When a prince gives an
order, according to Bayle, he is responsible not only for the explicit acts that
the order endorses, but also for the foreseeable actions that arise from the
way the order is carried out. For example, if an officer is given an order to
interrogate all evildoers who enter into a kingdom, he is likely to use what
are, on his judgment, the means necessary to complete that end.

28

If the

order is badly formulated, or the king could have the reasonable presupposition that such an order will result in crimes, then the king is morally responsible for all the officer does that could be reasonably foreseen. Of course,
there are limits; Bayle would not say that the king is responsible for utterly
irrational and unreasonable interpretations of the order. If the officer decided to interrogate all birds that entered into the kingdom because the officer was under the supposition that all birds were necessarily evildoers, the
king could not be blamed for that, provided the king had no idea of the officer’s irrational beliefs.29
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See Kilcullen 1988, 74.
However, if after having found out about the bird situation, the king neglected to either
change the order or remove the officer, then the king would be blameworthy. But then he
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People who advocate intolerance, Bayle thinks, must necessarily advocate the foreseeable evils that come with it, because they are entailed by intolerance. Intolerance, during Bayle’s time, routinely included brutal acts of
violence such as punishment by “fire, Banishment, Dungeons, and quartering of Soldiers”. All of these acts are inherently immoral. The fact that coercion in religious matters leads to such actions therefore makes the practice
of religious intolerance morally problematic. Since it is foreseeable that the
order to not tolerate will result in widespread crimes, the order to not tolerate (reasonable) dissenting religions is immoral.
The response, of course, could be that coercion in religious matters
does not entail such extreme actions: instead, punishment for being in the
wrong religion could be relatively light, such as merely imposing fines. Thus,
a state could still reap the benefits of a supposed intolerant policy, while
keeping its hands free of the intrinsically bad deeds such as burning by the
stake, and what not. Now, as discussed later, Pierre Bayle does not necessarily object to lighter burdens against certain religions, provided they keep
within certain bounds.30 However, those burdens are meant to serve a much
less comprehensive purpose than the ones that are proposed by those Bayle
considers intolerant--conversion of all heretics. Furthermore, the proponents of such policies don’t usually recognize any inherent limit to how they

would be blameworthy for not correcting his mistake, and all subsequent actions of the officer, not the initial acts of the officer engaging in unreasonable interpretations of the order.
30
See my discussion of the type of instruction a king may impose, in the second section of
this paper.
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may accomplish this goal. Thus, the tendency is to push towards more and
more “effective” methods, when the old gentle methods don’t work, or are
shown to be less effective than the brutal ones. After all, if some fear works
wonders in making men listen more easily to the reason, why not add more
fear and pain to make it go even quicker?31 Since the only purpose of the
coercion is to maximize the amount of conversions to the one true religion,
there doesn’t seem to be a natural stopping point for coercion into different
religions. While it may be theoretically possible for someone to advocate
stopping at some point, it turns out in practice that once you admit that it is
permissible to coerce others into accepting a religion, people start finding all
sorts of reasons to have more and more extensive punishment (as evidenced by the example of France and Spain). The institution of coercion
seems to provide its own justification for more and more brutality.32 Thus,
there are good institutional reasons not to start down the path of religious
coercion: when we look at the moral costs honestly, no moral person can
endorse the logical conclusion.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined some of the arguments that Bayle uses
to establish the wrongness of religious intolerance. First, the efficacy of religious intolerance in persuading others to convert to the true religion can
31
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never be firmly established and we can assumed to it is ineffective. Second,
and more importantly for Bayle, religious intolerance is intrinsically bad because it a) always implies the repression of conscience which is necessary
for good action, b) cannot be willed to be a universal practice, as binding on
all persons and sects, and c) as an institution, leads to even worse crimes. If
I have done my job right, I have hopefully made some of Bayle’s arguments
plausible, and have sufficiently sketched out Bayle’s general moral theory. In
the next chapter, I will proceed to derive a normative principle of toleration
from Bayle.

3

A Baylean Principle of Toleration
Bayle argues that because of the unique role that conscience plays, we

cannot assume that holding true opinions (about religion) gives us the right
to persecute those who do not hold true opinions. We must grant that if we
think we have the obligation (and right) to persecute those who hold false
opinions, then those who hold false opinions may think they are obligated
(and have the right) to persecute us. In order to avoid this conclusion, we
must say that we are obligated to tolerate differences in religious opinion.
This argument for religious toleration can also be extended to belief and
practices that are not religious in nature.
While Bayle offers a coherent account of why we are obligated
to tolerate, he is not nearly as clear as to what we should tolerate. Bayle of-
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fers tokens of proper instances of toleration, but he only gestures at a normative principle of toleration; nor does he give a strict definition of the concept of toleration. In this paper, I intend to draw out a Baylean normative
principle of toleration and see whether it can plausibly play a role in deciding
what we may and may not tolerate. This will entail uncovering both (1)
Bayle’s conception of toleration and (2) a Baylean normative principle of toleration. In discussing these, I show that Bayle’s conception of toleration importantly differs from contemporary theories. In addition, I also attempt to
make Bayle’s normative principle of toleration at least prima facie compelling; I do not intend to argue that the Baylean principle is better than a
competing normative principle of toleration: only that it is conceptually coherent.
3.1 What can (and must) be tolerated according to Bayle

Bayle offers a defense of toleration that relies on the premise that the
only conduct which can be considered good, as Kilcullen puts it, is that conduct which is done according to a person’s conscience.33 Conduct that does
not follow from a person’s conscience does not deserve praise, even if the
action performed would be otherwise praiseworthy. However, just because
an action is done according to conscience does not imply that we should tolerate it. It might be good (in this sense) for the sincere murderer to mur33

See Killcullen 1988, 71. Note that Bayle differentiates between an actions being good and
an action being right. Acting on your conscience is a necessary condition for your action being right, not a sufficient one. But acting on your conscience is a sufficient condition for it
being good.
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der, but we are not obligated to tolerate her murderous ways.34 Respect for
conscience has limits.
Bayle tells us that nearly all opinions about religious doctrines may be
tolerated; states and religious groups are obligated to tolerate Jews, Muslims, and even Pagans, though not Catholics and Atheists.35 The reason that
Bayle gives for not tolerating Catholics and Atheists, however, is not tied to
the intrinsic wrongness of their beliefs; rather, it is because of a perceived
danger to the wider society. Catholics, Bayle thought, are too tied by obligation to the Roman Catholic Church, and to the practices of forcing belief to
be allowed positions of power.36 However, Bayle’s view is that provided
Catholics are willing to keep their divisive opinions to themselves, there is no
justification for oppressing them in any way.37 The mere fact that they hold
the opinion only justifies suspicion, not banishment. In addition, Bayle
claims, since atheists are not capable of swearing the oaths that are necessary for the maintenance of society, it is permissible not to tolerate them.38
Jews, Muslims, and Pagans, however, do not suffer from these objections. Those who are prepared to tolerate the beliefs of others and who do
not resort to objectionable methods for spreading their religion ought to be
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Remember, a good action is not necessarily a right action; some may even be wrong.
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allowed to practice their religion.39 Sects that do not practice toleration
ought not to be tolerated, since they are a) committing a practice that is
morally wrong, and b) might endanger the safety of the state. This leaves,
of course, most groups being tolerated. Bayle’s emphasis, however, is on
the individuals (and, as we saw above, their consciences). Hence, while he
would have us tolerate many groups of believers, he would also have us tolerate those who decide to depart from religious groups. Bayle does not envision a regime like the Ottoman Empire, in which different religions are tolerated, but no dissension or novelty from the originating religions are tolerated
either by the government or by the originating sects.40 In this sort of scenario, only already established groups would be tolerated and individuals
would not be allowed to found new religious groups. A Baylean regime of toleration would be much more tolerant of individual beliefs. In fact, Bayle
says we are obligated to permit “innovations in religion,” thus mandating the
state step in to prevent religions from persecuting dissenters, unlike the Ottoman Empire regime.41 So while Bayle’s Commentary concerns itself primarily with the problem of group toleration, Bayle does not make the subsequent step of thinking that it is primarily groups that need to be tolerated.
Bayle is concerned with the practice of tolerating the individuals who make
up the groups, not just tolerating the existence of different groups.
39
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While Bayle does not explicitly tell us that we ought to tolerate
different religious practices as well as different religious beliefs, he is implicitly committed to that as well. Among the things to be tolerated are parents
raising their children with a (perhaps religious) belief set that they choose
and people worshipping at home, both of which imply rather robust ideas
about the range of acceptable conduct.42 Bayle’s tolerance of Jews and Muslims also entails tolerating different modes of conduct, since being Jewish or
Muslim in Bayle’s day required eating different foods and adhering to different norms of conduct.
However, Bayle does not think that we are required to permit the construction of public places of worship, or to permit processions in the street,
as these are not essential to freedom of religion.43 The word “public” in this
context is ambiguous: Does Bayle intend to say that we are not obligated to
use public funds to build places of worship, or that we are not obligated to
tolerate the building of public temples in the sense of being out in the open
for everyone to see? The first sense would be fairly innocuous; many liberals
would agree that we are not obligated to give public funds to every religious
sect that wants them. In fact, many modern day liberals might even go so
far as to say that we are required not to use public funds to build places of
worship, since that would be a violation of the doctrine of the neutral state,
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that is, one that endeavors not to endorse one view or another in public conflict.44
I think Bayle probably intended to say that we are not obligated to let
sects build temples at all, rather that just indicating that we are not obligated to fund them. It would fit the below reading of Bayle’s principle of toleration, which does not make non-interference the standard by which we
measure toleration. The more limited reading of toleration would also cohere
with Bayle’s non-endorsement of the fully neutral state. (Though Bayle is
very progressive for his day, we should take pains to distinguish his position
from John Stuart Mill’s position, for example.)
3.2 Bayle’s Conception of Toleration

While Bayle praises toleration, and gives limits for what we may tolerate, he is not careful to tell us what toleration requires conceptually. However, we can develop Bayle’s conception of toleration through comparison
with our own. Bayle accepts what Rainer Forst calls the “objection, acceptance, and rejection” requirements for toleration; Bayle thinks that toleration
entails objecting to some practice or belief, but accepting that there is some
reason to accept its practice.45 The main difference between Bayle’s conception of toleration and a contemporary conception of toleration is that Bayle
does not think that tolerating an action entails non-interference. As seen
44
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above, Bayle also thinks that toleration means allowing the propagation of
differing beliefs and the education of children in them, but not necessarily
accepting the right of individuals to either build public churches or parade in
the streets. Toleration for Bayle also doesn’t entail that the sovereign refrain
from taking a position on religious matters; the sovereign might justifiably
require that everyone becomes educated with some of the major doctrines
of the sovereign’s own religion.46
However, toleration and respect for other persons’ rights of conscience
requires that we do not make adhering to a given belief set P impossibly
burdensome, due to financial restrictions, rewards, or punishments.47 Doing
any of these would give the person incentive to violate their conscience; and
any action that is intended to corrupt a person’s conscience is one that is
morally blameworthy since abiding by one’s own conscience is required for
an act to be good. But we might be permitted to impose some costs, such as
prohibiting the construction of public churches (see above) or requiring some
religious education in the sovereign’s chosen religion.48 Accordingly, what
counts as toleration for Bayle seems to be something like:
Tb: A principled refraining from imposing excessive costs and/or
rewards on a person’s beliefs or actions, despite the beliefs or
actions being thought objectionable.49
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By comparison, a modern formulation of tolerance would be something
like:
T: A principled act of non-interference against certain conduct,
beliefs, or persons, despite the conduct being found objectionable.
What determines whether a cost is excessive in Tb is dependent on the
context. For example, whether an individual is antecedently impoverished
might determine whether the costs imposed on her for remaining in a different religion violates the doctrine of toleration. It is conceptually possible that
if receiving instruction in another religion is too costly for some individual,
the sovereign cannot simultaneously tolerate her and impose such instruction on her, even though Bayle says the sovereign is entitled to impose such
instruction.50 We might imagine that some individuals are so fearful that the
very idea that the sovereign leans one way rather than another in terms of
religion might impermissibly tempt them to abandon their consciences. Such
individuals would be very rare, and Bayle might think that there are no such
individuals that exist in this world; thus, as a matter of contingent fact, sovereigns remain entitled to impose such instruction while still being considered tolerant. But if Bayle’s conception of toleration is to remain consistent,
there may be some theoretical point at which the sovereign may not impose
instruction. Excessive costs, and what toleration demands of us, must be
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considered context-sensitive, liable to change depending on the political, individual, and social conditions.
3.3 A Initial Formulation of the Baylean Toleration Principle
Having defined Bayle’s conception of toleration, we can now move on
to the process of defining the normative limit of toleration. A preliminary
reading of Bayle suggests that the one reason we have to interfere with actions done in accord with one’s conscience is to protect the stability of society. I call this first formulation of the principle, A.

A: The sovereign (or other governing authority) is permitted to
not tolerate only such actions and/or creeds that she thinks interferes with the stability of society.51
Such a principle would capture the main thrust of Bayle’s toleration argument. Judges and sovereigns should not judge the truth of beliefs, but
whether the beliefs threaten the stability of society.

52

While the criterion of

good action, according to Bayle, is acting according to your conscience, the
judge is not required to take that into account; indeed, in some cases the
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judge may be obligated to ignore the fact that you were acting according to
your conscience!53
At this point, some would be satisfied with this account of the normative principle of tolerance for Bayle. After all, this principle is one that Bayle
explicitly endorsed:
That Soverigns, having an essential and unalienable Right of enacting laws for the Preservation of the State and Society over
which they are plac’d, may ordain, that all, without distinction,
who endanger the Public Peace by Doctrines tending to Sedition,
Rapine, Murder, Perjury &c. be punish’d according to the Nature
of their Crimes.54
This passage provides prima facie reason to believe that we should
read Bayle as endorsing this principle. It also has the virtue of fitting in
neatly with Bayle’s previous statements about how the sovereign is not entitled (nor capable) of judging the truth of certain beliefs, at least in the role
of being a sovereign. The investigation about which crimes may be justifiably
prohibited under A is relatively simple, since the consensus about which actions and beliefs tend to undermine the “Public Peace” would be much greater than consensus about which beliefs are in themselves objectionable. In
addition, most would agree the sovereign has an interest and an obligation
in preserving the stability of a society.
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3.4 Which Societies deserve to be protected?
However, principle A is not sufficient. While Bayle is concerned with
the stability of society, he must have criteria about the worthiness of the society itself. If a society is stable but represses conscience routinely, it is
doubtful that Bayle would say that we should wish to see its stability supported. Rational persuasion against the tenets of Nazi Germany might plausibly be held to undermine the stability of society under such a regime, but
that would not render the action of the Nazi governments in interfering with
rational persuasion right, for two different reasons. One, we might think,
with H.L.A Hart, that a wicked society does not have a right to defend itself.55 Second, Bayle says we are obligated to allow those with differing
viewpoints about religious matters an opportunity to inform us about their
opinions.56 Since Nazi Germany would directly interfere with the ability of
persons to test their opinions about the true religion, this would constitute
another telling objection against allowing the stability of Nazi Germany to be
the mark of whether an opinion should be tolerated or not. This would also
rule out societies that force their members to subscribe to one particular religion over another as a condition for membership in the political society; societies that did this to their members might be forcing their members to renege on their obligation to hear dissenting views, thus forcing their members
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to commit a moral wrong.57 The banning of expression of rational persuasion
should show that this account of a Baylean principle is flawed; we must determine what type of society is permissible.
Thankfully, Bayle actually provides us with a state of nature account of
what type of society people would enter into. Bayle states that
For the same Reason it’s evident, that no Body of Men, who enter into Society, and deposite their Liberty in the hands of a
Soverign, ever meant to give him a Power over their Consciences: this were a Contradiction in terms: for unless we suppose the Partys to the original Contract errand Ideots or mad
Men ….Such engagements therefore [to make their progeny adhere to a particular religion] are null and void in themselves, and
exceed the Power of those who make ‘em.’”58
Bayle is clearly pointing towards a contract model that tells us what
sort of society may be justified—though his account is incomplete.59 One
reason for that incompleteness may be that Bayle is not (explicitly) concerned with the legitimacy of government in this book, whereas other writers
that use the contract model, such as John Locke, are. But Bayle is clearly
gesturing towards the idea that there is a certain set of boundaries that society may not overrun in the pursuit of stability.
Bayle can be interpreted, in the passage just proffered, as saying that
the right of conscience is inalienable; persons in the state of nature are not
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at liberty to give it up. However, even if we don’t agree with Bayle that the
right of conscience is inalienable, we can think that people in the state of nature would not give up their right of conscience, because the costs of doing
so are greater than any benefits that could be gained. For example, people
in the state of nature might refuse to give up their right of conscience because to give up their right of conscience endangers their immortal soul: if
they act against what their conscience tells them to do, then they must be
committing a bad act, since acting against your conscience is a necessary
condition for acting in a good way. In more secular terms, we might argue
that acting according to your conscience is an essential human interest;
thus, it is almost impossible to think of situations that people would willingly
give up their right of conscience.60
It would be more convenient if Bayle said that we enter into society
primarily to protect our right of conscience: however, there are many other
things which society does for us that do not revolve around the right of conscience, such as protection of property rights. In any event, either the inalienability of the right of conscience or the central interest of the right of conscience will deliver the conclusion that societies may not violate the right of
conscience.
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3.5 The second version of the Baylean Principle of Toleration
So now we need to change A to
A2: The sovereign is permitted to not tolerate such actions
and/or beliefs that she thinks interferes with the stability of a society that meets the minimum standards of S.
Where S stands for:
S: A society that fully protects, among other rights, the right of
conscience.61
This formulation goes a long way towards limiting the actions of tyrannical societies. While the sovereign is still permitted to not tolerate such actions as she thinks “interfere” with the society, she has to subject her interference to an idealized standard in order to justify it. This would ordinarily
exclude the possibility of a sovereign being permitted to interfere with practices that would not undermine a good society. The sovereign of Nazi Germany, according to this principle, would not be able to interfere with the
practices of a Quaker sect that advocated pacifism. Even if the actions of the
Quaker sect created instability due to the intolerant activities of opposing
sects, the sovereign would not be justified in repressing the Quaker sect because their actions would not have created instability in an ideal society.62
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The reason that I put in “among other rights” is that there might be other rights that a
society needs to respect other than the right of conscience in order to be ideal.
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However, if the sovereign of a tyrannical society sincerely believed that the actions she
was not tolerating would undermine the stability of a society S, then her actions would have
to be considered “good” but not right. However, the way she came to have those beliefs
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Thus, intolerant societies do not get the benefit of the doubt under the Baylean standard.
However, the question may arise as to why we don’t say
A3: The sovereign of a society of type S is permitted to not tolerate such actions and/or beliefs that she thinks interfere with
the stability of her society. 63
After all, both principles A2 and A3 try to eliminate the possibility of
the sovereign of Nazi Germany being able to cite concerns about stability to
justify repressive policies. A3 also has the advantage of being simpler to understand, and avoids the problem of the sovereign being under an idealized
standard.
A3, however, is too strong. As formulated, A3 would not only exclude
those societies that are perfectly tyrannical, but also those in a state of transition from being intolerant to tolerant. Suppose there was a society that
was transitioning from being Nazi Germany to something like a liberal democracy. Let us also suppose there was an intolerant group that would have
been justifiably not permitted (in that transitioning regime) under A2. Under
A3, the transitional society would not be able to interfere with the actions of
the intolerant group, since only a society that fulfilled S currently would have
the right to not tolerate these actions. This would exclude societies that are
in the process of changing their intolerant laws and regimes from preventing
would play a role in determining whether her belief could be counted as sincere, and thus
her action good: see section 3.6 below.
63
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intolerant actions. For example, it would be then impermissible for post
World War 2 Japan to prevent religious persecution, since they might have
still been moving towards a society that fulfilled S.

64

In effect, only the perfectly tolerant society would have the right to
defend itself. This might have the unfortunate effect, depending on how seriously we take standard S, of saying that no society that existed at the time
Bayle had the right to defend itself. I am not prepared to say that any particular regime coincides perfectly with the standards of S; nor does it seem
likely to conclude that Bayle thought that no society of his time possessed
the right to defend itself. In the absence of convincing evidence otherwise,
we should remain with A2 in lieu of the more radical A3.
3.6 Does it matter if we are right?

The principles I have formulated raise the question of why we require
the sovereign to act according to what she thinks interferes with the stability
of the ideal society, rather than what would actually interfere with the stability of the ideal society. Here I am keeping in line with Bayle’s normative theory, in which we are not required to act in accord with the truth, but only according to how we perceive the world around us.65 Part of Bayle’s case for
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toleration rests on the idea that we are obligated to act according to our
conscience, which means we can be obligated to act in a way that follows
from moral (or other) facts if we do not know those facts (since we would
not be able to formulate the idea to do so for that reason ourselves, we
could not act according to our conscience in that way). In fact, the sovereign
may be blameworthy if she acts according to,
P*: the sovereign is permitted not to tolerate such actions that actually interfere with the stability of the society that meets standards S.
The sovereign would be blameworthy if she does not actually believe
that the actions interfere with the stability of a society that meets standards
S. What matters in determining goodness is whether a person acts according
to how they think they ought to act (according to their own conscience).
But this might lead to the query about whether Bayle’s standard actually means anything substantive. For if the moral rule only consists in acting
as you think you ought to act, why isn’t the ruler of our bad society entitled
to act according to the stability of the bad society, provided he really and
truly thinks it is best? And indeed, in some possible world, Bayle might agree
that the ruler of a bad society might be permitted (or even obligated) to act
according to what she thinks is best. However, this could be the case only if
the ruler really did not have any information to the contrary, or was even
aware of the possibility that there could be disagreement.66
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While the sovereign is obligated to do as she thinks is right, how she
gets to what she thinks is right provides normative constraints. In our world,
the sovereign would hopefully realize that there are profound disagreements
in religious and moral matters, not all of which are motivated by selfinterest, but some of which are motivated by honest perplexity.67 Indeed,
Bayle’s writings could be seen as part of an effort to show that not all disagreements about moral matters are motivated by self-interest or obstinacy.
By writing about the different ways in which different peoples worship God,
or follow the rules of morality, Bayle provides reasons to think that disagreements about many moral matters may have their origins in principled
reasoning, thus undermining the thesis that different ways of worshipping
God are necessarily blasphemous.

68

The sovereign should also realize (un-

less there has been a systematic effort to keep her in the dark) that it is
possible to be mistaken about moral beliefs, which implies that there needs
to be an epistemological standard through which we determine which beliefs
about what ought to be done are correct (or justifiable). The sovereign must
also be aware of there being different countries and communities that do
certain things differently, implying that the standards of the sovereign’s actual community are not the standard for everybody. This does not imply
relativism; Bayle is committed to the idea that there are actual moral rules
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Compare Bayle 2005, 148.
Compare Bayle 2005, 205.
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(of which one is “follow your conscience”). But it does commit Bayle to
fallibilism about moral knowledge: all of our moral beliefs could be mistaken.
This set of considerations implies that a sovereign must also have beliefs that are not formed by obviously bad processes. For instance, if the
sovereign forms her beliefs on the basis of some information gathering process that she suspects are flawed, then she could not justifiably (at least according to Bayle), act on those beliefs. But if the sovereign never comes
across any information that puts in doubt her assessment about either a)
what the stability of the ideal society would need or b) the method by which
she formed her opinion, than she is not blameworthy for her actions, even if
she is incorrect on the matter. Furthermore, if the sovereign is forced to act
on belief A in a time of crisis, she is not blameworthy if she does not justify
A, provided she has another belief which states that her taking the time to
justify belief A would pose an unacceptable risk.

69

If, however, the sover-

eign deliberately limited her belief, or refused to investigate other possibilities, she is blameworthy for her belief gathering process, and thus she cannot be said to be acting according to her conscience. Her actions, according

69

This is not unreasonable. To motivate this, suppose any trolley case and also suppose
that it is permissible to let one person die to save five others. Any person acting on this belief would not be blameworthy if they did not engage in an investigation about the relative
moral worth of the five individuals on the other track vs. the one, even if it turns out that
the one is Phillippa Foot, and the others turn out to be members of the Nazi Party. A key
part of the blamelessness of the lack of investigation is that we believe we do not have time
to investigate. For more on Trolley cases, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, "The Trolley Problem,"
The Yale Law Journal 94, no. 6 (May 1985): 1395-1415.
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to Bayle, could no longer be considered even good, let alone right.

70

We

should further amend principle A2 to read:

A4: The sovereign is permitted to not tolerate (where toleration
refers to Tb) such actions or creeds that she believes (when belief meets standard B) would endanger the stability of the society
that meets standard S, which may or may not be the same society that the sovereign rules.
B: A belief is acceptable as a principle for action when either a)
the person holding the belief has encountered no reason to
doubt the belief or the method by which she attained it, or b)
has engaged in a good faith effort to justify the belief.
S: A society that fully protects, among other rights, the right of
conscience.
Tb: A principled refraining from imposing excessive costs and/or
rewards on beliefs or actions, despite the beliefs or actions being
thought objectionable.
At this point, I have maintained Bayle’s central doctrine, in that the sovereign is not responsible for making sure his beliefs on the matter are true;
but I have also shown there are significant limitations on the sort of beliefs
that would actually past muster. In many cases, the sovereign would be required to justify the belief about what is tolerable or not or at least go try to
establish a reliable method of justice for determining what may be just or
not. While the sovereign who keeps this theory in mind may sometimes be
70

This would rule out, as a matter of contingent fact, the goodness of tyrannical rulers not
tolerating: they presumably (but not always) deliberately limited their belief gathering processes.
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be mistaken about what the ideal society may require, the process of answering principle A4 will hopefully generate answers that are stable and correct as far as what the ideal society would require.
3.7 Conclusion to part three
I have made the first steps towards identifying a Baylean principle of
toleration. I have also successfully shown that Bayle’s theory concerning the
limits of toleration can actually have normative force in terms of showing
what we should tolerate, rather than just reaffirming the right of sovereigns
to do whatever they wish. Thus, this Baylean principle of toleration has conceptual bite, and is a viable competitor to other normative principles of toleration, such as Mill’s Harm principle. However, whether the Baylean principle of toleration is better than its competitors remains an open question.

4

Final Thoughts
In part 2 of this paper, I gave an exposition of Bayle’s defense of relig-

ious toleration, giving an account of his general moral theory, its resemblance to that of Kant’s, and showing that Bayle’s defense remains compelling even if we don’t believe in God. After giving the context, I then showed
that one can derive a normative principle of toleration that has conceptual
bite, though I have declined to show that the principle I have derived is superior to any of the other competitors on the market. I hope that my work
here will help further scholarship into Bayle’s theory of toleration.
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